Direct democracy: A Democratic system of self-rule

Swiss semi-direct democracy.

Introduction

In the early 19^th century, in Switzerland, the roots of democracy were watered and fertilised by the cantons, under the banner of sovereignty of the people. Through the Swiss constitutional framework, the separation of powers and free competitive elections of representatives were initiated. However, it was quickly realised that this system of democracy resembled the old regimes (Ancien Régime) where power was held by a privileged few and was open to abuse by elected representatives. This then required an evolved democracy where the people held the final decision in matters of legislation and self-government. Hence, referendums became a feature of Swiss democracy in 1848. The type of governance and statement of intent was revised from one of “government for the people” to government through the people, and self-rule.

Switzerland’s semi-direct democracy (representative and citizen referenda) allows citizens to challenge parliamentary decisions through optional referendums (requiring 50,000 signatures to oppose a law passed by parliament) and popular initiatives (requiring 100,000 signatures to propose constitutional amendments). Further, mandatory Referendums are held in matters of constitutional change, for example, joining international organizations, or emergency legislation. A deviation occurs when the public’s vote (either accepting or rejecting a proposal) contradicts the parliament's or Federal Council’s recommendation, typically to reject initiatives or accept parliamentary laws. This essay will argue that direct democracy (popular referenda) is a viable option that will pierce the cartel parties of the UK’s political system and set the preferences of the electorate as the guide stones for a successful democratic system. In this endeavour, if it were to be realised would not only redress the asymmetry of the UK's political system but, in its methods, create a highly informed citizenry, and their representatives would be more attuned to their constituencies' preferences.

How does it work

Stage one, in Swiss democracy, is the pre-referendum phase, a screening process whereby questions are, for want of a better word, whittled down. A variety of alternative questions to be voted on are refined in the process (usually to around two questions). In this process, an effort is made to synthesise questions in an attempt to avoid the aggregation paradox. During this phase, the electorate is encouraged to discuss, examine, and refine their positions on proposals. Referenda are the ideal vehicle to initiate discussion between citizens, which is encouraged by access to pertinent information by the government, allowing for informed decision-making. This pre-referendum discussion helps the electorate to articulate their preferences, facilitating mutual bargaining and exchange, while setting out the agenda preferences, thereby drawing a circle around the relevant decision-making area. An advantage to this process materialises as limiting free riding or rent seeking, in terms of free riders they have at least a stake in issues presented, therefore it is in citizens interests to participate in the dialogue and in terms of rent seekers disallows those wishing to game the system, by privileged access, for example, in the UK, during Covid many political actors used their position to serve family and business associates to gain substantial government contracts.

The post-referendum stage entails those who field propositions. In this endeavour, there is an attempt to predict voting patterns on questions. If voter outcome prediction indicates poor support, these proposals can then be refined to attract more voters to their proposition. During this process government may present alternative (counter) propositions. If it appears that government propositions will garner more votes, initial propositions will be withdrawn. In the Swiss direct democracy system, many questions are withdrawn during this phase. On occasion, when there are unusually large minorities (explained later in examples), the government will at least meet some of the conditions of the proposals. Equally, if there are large discrepancies between the majority and by regions, a new initiative may be forwarded, or the matter of contention may be adjusted.

Constitutional questions

When questions relate to the Swiss Constitution, decisions are more restrictive due to the salient nature of this form of referendum. Changes in the federal constitution must be approved by the majority of both the voters and the cantons/regional authorities; (a double majority) initiatives to change the federal constitutions are put to the vote, with the support of 100,000 citizens (about 2 percent of the electorate), meaning at least 100.000 citizens must vote to carry the proposal to the next phase. While optional referenda concerning changes in federal laws need only be supported by 50,000 citizens (Frey, 1994). Article three of the Swiss Constitution reserves all powers to the cantons, except when specifically assigned to the Federal government. Cantons must propose amendments for each new responsibility. It should be noted, not all decisions on Constitutional change are open to the electorate; however, in all matters that are of Constitutional importance, the people are given the last word, with the possibility to control salient legislation. In terms of sovereignty, the people's determinations are viewed as the purest form of democracy. Meaning those decisions by the lectorate are bestowed the highest authenticity, therefore legitimacy, as they represent self-rule. Most legislation made by parliament is not contested by the people via referendum (60%-40%). In cases of government ordinances, these are excluded from the referendum process. Ultimately, the majority of decisions are made by parliament and the executive, as they are in representative democracies, and this is why Switzerland can be better described as a semi-direct democracy, aligning with features of both systems. A common misconception of Swiss direct democracy is the association with plebiscites; however, the Swiss system differs markedly in that it is not within the government's remit to decide when to hold a referendum. It is written into the Constitution, stating, all adjustments must be voted on, with all laws exposed to direct participation.

Examples of how Swiss semi-direct democracy works

Examples of how Swiss direct democracy impacts Swiss political culture, as discussed by Kriesi, (2012) may be opposed to parliamentary and perceived citizens’ attitudes to the Swiss army. Attitudes that, before the vote, placed the Swiss army as a sacred institution. The initiative discussed was to abolish the Swiss Army and was preceded by an extensive discussion by the citizenry and the political institutions of government. What followed was a lively and somewhat heated debate. Both chambers of the Swiss parliament and the federal government communicated their opposition to this initiative in no uncertain terms. The expectation, considering the cultural attachment of the Swiss to their Army, was that this initiative would be emphatically rejected. The vote held on November 26, 1989, produced some unexpected results, and although the motion was rejected with 64% voting against and with 36% in favour, the significant minority in favour resulted in reforms of the military. Similar initiatives were also voted on and rejected in 2001 and 2013, focused on abolishing conscription or replacing the army with a Peace Corps. The man who raised the initial proposition in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall was a petrol station attendant and, in a previous era, was a conscientious objector, and also a supporter of communism. The organising committee, founded by Oliver Krieg, was one of the largest on record, with a hundred members. His motivation was mired in his opposition to military service by conscription, and where the penalty for rejecting conscription was imprisonment. Ironically, his surname means war in German. Up to a million Swiss citizens supported his initiative.

A further example described Hanspeter Kriesi, the author of Direct democracy: The Swiss experience, relates to Swiss attitudes to nuclear energy in the late seventies where there was a vote to place limiting regulations on nuclear energy in 1979, and to safeguard the rights of Swiss citizenry in their democratic right to have a say, where they can influence and challenge decision makers on matters regarding construction and the operation of nuclear power plants. The initiative for the preservation of popular rights and the security for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants was narrowly rejected on February 19, 1979, by a majority of 51%. In the aftermath of this result, the positive feature meant further discussion on the dangers and risks of nuclear energy was elevated in the public consciousness, which at the time was exceptional for a European country.

As much as it may initially look as though political institutions held the popular vote on both initiatives, simultaneously it must be acknowledged that the resulting national conversation and discussion, and argument resulted in the enhanced understanding of the issues and polices by the citizenry.

In for example Germany dialogue related to nuclear energy was monopolised by elected representatives and political institutions, meaning that through no national discussion, it was confined to the tight space of the cartelised political system, where all political institutions were united in their support for nuclear energy. In comparison to representative democracies of European countries, the Swiss system was able to react faster than their European counterparts to environmental and public safety issues concerning nuclear energy, resulting in a far more informed citizenry by national dialogue, fielding challenges and mutual bargaining, while increasing the evaluation and measurement of policies by the citizens. Meaning decisions are viewed by citizens as valid and simultaneously legitimising the political system. In both cases, the above initiatives influenced policies made in the future. Furthermore, both issues brought a greater understanding to representatives of their constituents' predilections.

While the above examples show little deviation between parliamentary agenda and citizen preferences, it must be noted that citizens breaking from the will of the political party cartel is not a rare feature in Swiss democracy. Since 1874-1990, there have been 250 referendums where the electorate has been called to the ballot. Data from this period indicates a 39% deviation, where the majority will deviate from the will of parliament.

Potential application for the United Kingdom

In my recent essay on cultural nationalism, I described how elite establishment attitudes towards nationhood, history, culture, and ethnicity are monopolised by a liberal internationalist/globalist worldview, where discussion is limited and confined to political institutions and legacy media, leading to a lack of trust in these institutions. In a system of direct democracy, these attitudes, ideologies, and policy positions, for example, open borders and mass immigration, would be, through selective initiatives, under full examination by the public. The resulting lively debate will bring more nuance and honesty to the national conversation, where all the government and the states' wares would be on full display, one that may well expose the emperor as wearing no clothes. Moreover, direct democracy has the potential to increase political participation. The UK's most recent General election of 2024 indicates why it is important that the citizenry have the final say. The poor turnout of the general election of 2024 led to a Labour government with 412 seats, with the second lowest turnout since 1884 at 59.8% of the electorate. Labour secured 33% of the vote. Given the turnout of roughly 59.8%–60%, this translates to Labour receiving votes from about 20% of the total registered electorate (33.8% of 60% = 20%). This calculation accounts for 40% of non-voters. With Labour winning 63% of seats with just 33.7%, amounting to around 9.7 million votes out of 48.2 million registered. Leading to questions that relate to the unresponsiveness and poor accountability mechanisms of UK political institutions and the crisis in democracy across the Western world

How direct democracy facilitates accountability between elections.

Between elections, political parties and politicians have considerable latitude to make decisions that are never discussed or equally have been put to the electorate as policy positions that will garner votes, which are then, after elections, reneged on. Additionally, there may be unexpected policies that are juxtaposed to their voter cohorts, and yet are brought into law. In countries where representative democracy is a feature, there is then little or no possibility to punish politicians who exploit their discretionary room as discussed by Bruno Frey in the Modern Political Economy 1978. Direct democracy initiatives have the effect of counterbalancing the lack of or weak accountability features of representative democracies. Pointing to agenda-setting power by the electorate, a citizen power that cannot be controlled by parliament, and forwarding initiatives is firmly in the hands of the people (Linder et al, 2021). In the UK, issues of expenses, MP salaries, and pensions are a matter of huge discontent among the electorate. And although these issues are relegated to the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, many believe this authority is less than independent, given the exorbitant salaries, expenses, and pensions MPs receive. Direct democracy initiatives have the power to amplify a national debate on these issues and allow the public a vote on what MPs receive in salaries, expenses, and pensions. This feature of direct democracy is a protective barrier against rent seeking. A current example of rent seeking was the extremely generous donations Keir Starmer received from his patron Lord Ali, and although the rules allow for donations, direct democracy has the potential to put an end to all such donations. The people have no power currently, as the rules are made by the political party cartel.

Cartelisation by political parties

Peter Mair, along with Richard Katz, developed the "cartel party thesis." This thesis argues that modern political parties have become increasingly professionalised and state-dependent, forming a "cartel" that prioritizes maintaining power and access to resources over representing citizens. Political parties have designed and implemented regulatory devices that do not constrain them and are, in effect, aesthetic at face value. Furthermore, in representative democracies via the political party system, parties have designed and implemented a plethora of controls in the electoral system that maintain a monopoly of the process, for example, FPTP and PR electoral processes, and gerrymandered constituency areas. What’s more, parties also benefit from substantial subsidies and subventions from the state. These can be quid pro quo or financial in nature. For example, short money, which is gifted to the opposition parties, with Labour receiving £6million in 2023 to fund staff and research. This is calculated on seats and votes from elections, with the formula of £21,438.33 per seat won plus £42.82 for every 200 votes gained. The representative democratic system allows the monopoly of party control of organisational processes, by the creation of light-touch rules and regulations, only tolerated by the distance of accountability of governance structures from the electorate. Within Representative democratic governance structures, many scholars, for example, Katz, Mair, and Kirchmeir, have indicated, this model does not serve the popular will and democracy but only the ambitions of the political party. Inter alia, this monopoly of organizational processes manifests as an increasingly close relationship with the state. Essentially, this enables parties to construct a legal environment that is complementary to their survival. Mass parties have over time constructed a self-focused ecosystem, creating conditions, via rules, regulations, and legislation needed for survival, that they alone dominate. Arguably, the public is outside this ecosystem, looking through a window, perceiving the political arena of political parties as a poor and foreign environment they cannot touch.

Snobby arguments against self-rule by the citizenry

There are a variety of arguments that would deny the demos' direct participation in the democratic process, one of which resides in antiquity, particularly emanating from the Platonic period, and one that persists in modernity. The argument suggests that people should not be allowed direct access to the democratic process due to a lack of cognitive competence. Giovanni Sartori, an Italian political scientist, was but one of this school of thought. In Plato's Republic, Plato conceived a utopia with morality as the foundation of his ideal state. Plato's state is a form of aristocratic government where all rulers will be philosophers and rule with wisdom and reason.” As many who, on reading this, would immediately find applying this train of thought to modernity is utterly laughable, in both, that almost all citizens would deny that the contemporary ruling elite are less than philosophers, devoid of morality, and without wisdom and reason. In the Polities (poleis) of Ancient Greece, the population had a literacy rate approximating 5-20% of the population. In modern Britain, the literacy rate sits at around 99% for adults aged 15 and above, indicating a near-universal literacy rate. As Benjamin Barber, an American political theorist and advocate for increased political participation, suggests, “there is great potential in the extension of democratic procedures beyond representative democracy, indicating participation in collective political decision-making will have an educative and empowering effect on the citizens and will, ultimately, create better citizens. The Swiss model confirms this argument.

A further argument suggests that modern populations are too large to accommodate the cost of regular referendums. The Swiss model that relies almost exclusively on mail-in ballots refutes this position. There may be scope to introduce a digital form of referendum, although, as with postal voting holds problematic issues relating to electoral fraud/cheating. Digital voting is an option that dramatically reduces cost. With the right will, this may be possible with legislative instruments that encourage disengagement of potential fraudsters with a thirty-five-year minimum custodial sentence for interference in the democratic process. Additionally, the electorate will have a vote on who administers the digital voting system in any future system and models with independent oversight. Is this too much to ask?

Swiss Political Success: Direct Democracy and Stability

Established in 1848 with the federal constitution, Switzerland’s system allows citizens to vote on national and cantonal issues through frequent referenda, for example, a 38.04% turnout in a 2025 referendum. This mirrors the participatory ideals of Barber (1984), who argued that active citizen involvement educates and empowers, creating “better citizens.” Unlike ancient Athens, where only 5–20% of male citizens participated due to literacy and status barriers, Switzerland’s near-universal literacy rate of 99%, equalling the UK, enables high rates of participation with informend decision making.

The federal system, with 26 cantons retaining substantial autonomy, bolsters local governance akin to Greek poleis, for example, Athens, while cultivating national unity. Switzerland’s neutrality, established since the 16th century, has spared her from major conflicts, unlike other Western representative democracies, allowing resources to be better placed on development. This stability in comparison dissolves Katz and Mair’s (2009) view of modern politics as an elite “cartel, as Swiss citizens have direct influence over the democratic process.

Switzerland ranks 8th in the 2023 Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, indicating strong democratic institutions, though it slipped from 7th due to minor issues like money laundering concerns. Its system mitigates Sartori’s (1987) concerns about “cognitive incompetence” by combining direct participation with representative structures, supported by high education levels, with 90% of adults completing upper secondary education.

Switzerland’s GDP per capita is among the highest globally, at $87,427 in 2022, ranking 3rd among OECD nations. Its economy thrives on high-value sectors like finance, pharmaceuticals, and precision manufacturing.

Net migration averaged 66,000 per year between 2013–2022, rising to 148,000 in 2023 due to Ukrainian refugees (50,000+ with S-status permits). In 2024, net migration fell to 83,392, a 15.6% decrease from 2023.

Despite four national languages, German 62.8%, French 22.9%, Italian 8.2%, Romansh, and a 25% immigrant population, Switzerland maintains social harmony through federalism and civic engagement. The list goes on and on. Switzerland is a functional society on every metric, political, social, and economic.

Conclusion

Direct democracy is not a form of democracy that should be viewed as replacing representative democracies, but a complementary addition, providing a vehicle for the legitimacy of political institutions that, in the contemporary period, is clearly lacking. In the current crisis of democracy across the Western world, direct democracy is a vehicle to foster more trust and legitimacy in political institutions, with the added value of increasing participation of the electorate.

As Peter Mair and Richard Katz, both of whom are distinguished political scientists who specialise in comparative politics, accurately point out, politics is perceived by the general public as no longer belonging to the citizen or society, but an activity detached as something only politicians do. A special club and you’re not in it, as humorously put by the comedian George Carlin. It can be said without much controversy that the general public's view of politicians is extremely poor due to several factors. Factors relating to unresponsive political parties, expense scandals, poor accountability mechanisms, corruption, embezzlement of party funds, sleaze, and general impropriety. Additionally, Gerry Stoker, a world-renowned British political scientist specialising in governance, political engagement, and democratic reform, suggests the new deferential and critical public owns a new citizen attitude and is less inclined to be submissive to authority and is more likely to be sophisticated in their understanding of politics possessing the ability to have a coherent understanding of issues of the day with the confidence to voice those understandings and critique government policy, either verbally or written. All three political scientists provide a framework pointing to why the public has a poor view of political parties and politicians, and why trust in democracy is declining in Western representative democracies.

Direct democracy has the potential to address the many concerns and insults to democracy emanating from a dysfunctional political ecosystem that, in large part, excludes meaningful participation by the British citizenry and the aspiration of genuine self-rule. There is much to learn from the Swiss model, and although Britain has a different constitutional makeup, it is certainly a model that can be applied to British political institutions.

References

Barber, B. R. (1984) Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley: University of California Press.

BBVA, (2023)The Swiss RECIPE, becoming one of the richest countries in the world. Available at: The Swiss recipe to be one of the world's most efficient countries | BBVA Switzerland

Bart E (2022) How many people were literate in antiquity. Available at: How Many People Were Literate in Antiquity? - The Bart Ehrman Blog

Calise, M. (1994) ‘The Italian Particracy: Beyond President and Parliament’, Political Science Quarterly, 109(3), pp. 441–460. doi: 10.2307/2152613

Election Guide, (2022) Swiss Confederation. Available at: IFES Election Guide | Country Profile: Switzerland

Frey, B.S., 1994. Direct democracy: Politico-economic lessons from Swiss experience. The American Economic Review, 84(2), pp.338-342.

Harvard University Press, (1991) Ancient literacy. Available at: Ancient Literacy — Harvard University Press

House of Commons Library (2025) Short Money, 31 January. Available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk (Accessed: 11 July 2025).

Katz, R., & Mair, P. (2009). The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement. Perspectives on Politics, 7(4), 753-766. doi:10.1017/S1537592709991782

Kriesi, H., 2012. Direct democracy: the Swiss experience. In Evaluating Democratic Innovations (pp. 39-55). Routledge.

Linder, W., Mueller, S., Linder, W. and Mueller, S., (2021). Direct democracy. Swiss democracy: Possible solutions to conflict in multicultural societies, pp.119-165.

Clarke, D., (2024) Share of votes won in the general election in the United Kingdom in 2024. Available at: UK election results by vote share 2024| Statista

Stoker, G. (2016) Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work. [2nd Edition] London: Palgrave. Ch.3.

SWI, (2024) Global rankings: where Switzerland gets good marks – and where it could do better. Available at: Global rankings: where Switzerland gets good marks – and where it could do better - SWI swissinfo.ch

SWI, (2024) When Switzerland clipped its army’s wings. Available at: When Switzerland clipped its army’s wings - SWI swissinfo.ch